The Eritrean Liberation Movement (Mahber Shewate Haraka) Excerpt from Eritrea: the making of a nation 1890-1991 By Redie Bereketeab 183-185 p.
The provisions of the federal accord were either gradually and systematically Disregarded or, simply repealed. With that disappeared all democratic rights' Once The avenues for peaceful and democratic political expression were closed, other, less overt, but more effective avenues had to be found for expressing political and national aspirations. This compelled Eritrean nationalists to search for alternative ways to challenge the Ethiopian encroachment. And because all the mechanisms through which political grievances could be channeled were banned, all political activities had to be clandestine. In November1 958, a group of Eritrean refugees in the Sudan took the initiative of organising political activity. Delegates were immediately dispatched to Eritrea to establish clandestine cells, which were formed in groups of seven persons in order to avoid detection by the Ethiopian security forces. As a result of this organizational method, the movement inside Eritrea took the name of Mahber Shewate ( association of group of seven). In the Sudan, it was known as Harakat Et Tahrir El Eritrya, Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM)' and better known in its short form, haraka.
The activities of the ELM were predominantly urban-based, founded by young Moslem nationalists residing in the Sudan. Its aim was to terminate Ethiopian rule through peaceful means, although later it attempted to launch an armed guerrilla insurrection. They were very much influenced by the nationalist movement in the Sudan, and particularly by the Sudan Communist Party.
The strategy of the urban Clandestine movement, according to Nawid (1997), was learned from the experienceof the Sudanese Communist Party. As soon as they could dispatch their representatives to Eritrea, the work of mobilization was carried out among the urban Population. The mobilization and recruitment work received an immediately positive response from both the Moslem and Christian communities, and in quite a short time, by April of 1959, clandestine cells had been established in almost all Eritrean towns. The ELM convened its first congress in Asmara in 1960. Employing the slogan "Muslims and Christians are brothers, and their unity makes Eritrea one [nation] ", the Movement strove for the unity of Eritrean society. The Movement's Three main objectives were unity, independence and building a democratic Eritrea. Its initial method of struggle to achieve independence was to topple the Eritrean marionette government through a revolutionary coup d'etat This was to be undertaken by anti-unionist elements of the Eritrean police force and a mass patriotic force, thereby forcing Ethiopia to withdraw from Eritrea (Nawid 1997). This was seen, in contrast to armed guerrilla struggle, as a relatively peaceful means. Therefore, in the early years of the 1960s it concentrated its activities in trying to
organise the coup d'etat. In fact, a plan of action was drawn up, but prematurely aborted when it was uncovered by Ethiopian security forces. The strategy of achieving independence through a revolutionary coup d 'etat proved to be unrealistic, at best. In addition to its impracticality, once the scheme was exposed the Ethiopian security forces inflicted a heavy blow on the ELM. Consequently the plan was abandoned. Afterwards, toward the mid-1960s, the ELM attempted to undertake armed struggle. However, by the time the movement started to establish military units, the initiative had already been taken by another, rival organisation, the E ritrean Liberation Front.
with the entrance of the ELM into the field, the liberation movement encountered its flrst substantiail internal conflict. The discord pivoted around the question of whether there should be two organizations. According to Nawid (1997), the ELM made a proposal to the leadership of the ELF to merge the two organisations. However, the proposal failed because of the ELF's rejection. This led to the first armed confrontation within the liberation movement.
The ELM accused the ELF of being responsible for this armed conflict. T he ELF, in response accused the ELM of Endangering the liberation movement first, by indulging in the unrealistic strategy of a revolutionary coup d'etat to liberate Eritrea, thereby trying to prevent an armed struggle from taking place. Second, when its strategy proved fatal, it attempted to dispatch armed units to the field and in doing so stole arms from the ELF (Ahmed 1997).
The antagonism between the two organizations reached its peak and was eventually resolved through coercive means, ending in the complete demise of the ELM. According to Markakis, the discordance between the two fronts can be explained in structural terms. First, the ELF viewed the ELM as a communist influenced organization. Second, sectionalism played a significant role. While the leaders of the ELM were from the Keren and Sahel regions, the leaders of the ELF were from the Barka region and this difference of origin contributed to the cleavage. Third, the ELM's attempt to broaden its organization through recruiting Christians also played not an insignificant role. The leaders of the ELF, and Idris Mohammed Adem in particular, disliked this strategy because in their view, it was the Christians that delivered Eritrea to Ethiopia in the first place (Markakis 1987: 108). According to Mohammed Said Nawid2, however, the ELF and ELM disagreed over the ELF leadership's belief that they had the sole mandate of representing the Eritrean people. The leaders of the ELF believed that mandate had been bestowed upon them during the time of political struggle in the 1940s and 1950s. They therefore believed that newly emerging political forces had no legitimacy. Moreover, their view that the Eritrean arena could not accommodate more than one organizational so constituted an irreconcilable point of difference. Ahmed Mohammed Nasir, acquiescing to the latter point admits that the chief reason for the ELF attacking the ELM was its belief that the Field could support only one organisation.
At last, the ELF Supreme Council decided to take military action against the Movement. The obliteration of the ELM unit by the ELF at Ela Tza'ada in 1965 Effectively terminated not only the military, but also the political existence of the ELM. Many believe that the legacy of this military action set the precedent for the later civil wars between the Eritrean organizations. Source: Eritrea: the making of a nation 1890-1991 By Redie Bereketeab 183-185 p.