Political reconciliation and political opposition
Excrept from Eritrea: Towards Unity in Diversity by DAVID POOL published in 1997 Minority Rights Group International Neither the ELF nor the EPLF tolerated opposition during the armed struggle. With the disintegration of the ELF into factions some of the latter joined the EPLF during the 1980s. After liberation, the EPLF’s criteria for the return of members of opposing fronts and factions was that they were welcome to return and join on an individual basis, but were not allowed to function as political organizations. Some did return and were given guarantees of freedom and of the establishment of a democratic political system. Two were subsequently appointed as provincial governors and others were appointed to the referendum and constitutional commissions. In the provinces, it was not unusual to meet former ELF fighters in administrative positions. In some cases, the reintegration did not work out. After a violent clash between one of the governors and EPLF members, the former returned abroad for hospital treatment and when the provinces were altered, the governor was not reappointed. Other opposition fronts rejected return on the terms set by the EPLF and the system established by it. Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) viewed the new government as highland Christian; EIJ called for its overthrow and replacement by an Islamic government. Abdallah Idris’s faction, with a following among the Bani Amir, rejected the government outright. The ELF faction with the largest following, mixed Christian–Muslim and members from most of the communities of Eritrea, was the ELFRevolutionary Council (ELF-RC). Its views place it within the mainstream of Eritrean nationalism with its stress on democracy, nationalism and secularism, and merit some examination. An analysis of its publications and an extensive interview with its leaders indicate a fundamental opposition to the EPLF and its policies.32 Other than expressing positive views about the EPLF’s liberation of Eritrea, the ELF-RC is critical of all the processes and policies pursued by the Eritrean government since liberation. Their main argument is that the EPLF is undemocratic: its leadership is a ‘totalitarian clique’ and runs its dictatorship through the PFDJ. It views the constitutional process as illegitimate: it was drafted by a commission which was hand-picked by the EPLF. Key policies on land rights, language, nationality and the press, were decided before the constitution, reflect narrow EPLF policies and bolster its power. The ELF-RC proposed an alternative constitutional
process involving representatives of different organizations and personalities that had participated in the liberation of Eritrea and had expressed a clear commitment to democracy. On these grounds the EIJ would be excluded. It also argued that ratification should be done by referendum and that Arabic and Tigrinya should be the official languages. Although the ELF-RC shares with the government a commitment to the separation of religion and politics, members of the leadership stressed to the author that the sharia (Islamic law) should be considered part of Eritrea’s cultural heritage and that if the EIJ emphasized Muslim rights rather than an Islamic state, cooperation with it would be possible. They also stressed that local customary laws should be maintained as part of Eritrea’s democratic tradition and that although both sharia and customary law might be adapted, it would have to be done by consensus. On these sensitive issues, the different approach appears to be one of emphasis rather than principle. While PFDJ leaders talk of establishing a national legal system in the longer term, ELF leaders talk of adaptation through consensus. For the PFDJ, the ELF-RC produces destructive and divisive criticisms without offering constructive proposals. Many independent Eritreans believe that the ELF-RC missed its chance by not returning after liberation, (the ELF-RC remains in exile). When this point was put to ELF-RC leaders they responded that returning would compromise their commitment to democracy and that the record of the treatment of returnees has been poor. They cited the disappearance and likely imprisonment of some ex-ELF fighters, and had given their names to human rights organizations. The author found it impossible to disprove or verify such claims. If these claims are true, they suggest a limited tolerance of critical opposition and strong grounds for clearer provisions for public trial, if only to dispel reports of arbitrary imprisonment.33 It remains to be seen whether critical organizations, like the ELF-RC, could reform as parties in the post-constitution period. Unlike other opposition elements the ELF-RC cannot be portrayed as ethnic, regionalist or sectarian. However, under the terms of the constitution, it could be proscribed on the grounds of threatening national unity. w 16