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The Eritrean – Eritrean Dialogue Challenges and Perspectives 
Workshop 
 
Paper: 
The Eritrean – Eritrean Dialogue 
Challenges and Perspectives 
  
By:Abdulrazig Karar 
 
 
Preface:  
 
The term dialogue is an  inclusive term that m eans among other meanings: 
argument and discussion; dialogue is m eant to exchange talks and discourse 
between two sides, but no t necessarily to have so mething that indicates 
dispute between those sides.     
 
The Eritrean – Eritrean Dialogue du ring the Political and Military 
Struggle  
 
The term dialogue had been circulatin g in the Eritrean arena throughout the 
various phases of the political struggle as well as the war of liberation. Some 
worth mentioning dialogue models durin g the early phases of the Eritrean 
struggle were the attempts of the Isla mic League and the Unionist Party on 
coming up with an alternative platfo rm for  the national independence, 
 
 اﻹﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻹرﺗﺮي اﻟﻤﺮآﺰ  اﻹﻓﺮیﻘﻲ اﻟﻘﺮن دراﺳﺎت ﻣﺮآﺰ  واﻟﺒﺤﻮث ﻟﻠﺪراﺳﺎت اﻷﺣﻤﺮ اﻟﺒﺤﺮ ﻣﺮآﺰ  

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which was adopted by the Islamic Leag ue and the Federal Unification with 
Ethiopia, which was adopted by the Unioni st Party. The alternative platform 
was to put Eritrea under British trust eeship; however, the two parties did not 
agree on this idea. 
 
Moreover, some discussions took place among the Eritrean Liberation Front, 
Popular Liberation Forces and the Erit rean Popular Liberation Front during 
the 1970s after waging vicious civil war among themselves in which each 
side tried to impose control on the gr ound following the exclusion of the 
others.  
 
It is known that the bilateral dialogue s between the two main factions of the 
time (the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Eritrea Popular Liberation Front) 
were based on the concept of the unity of progressive forces; an indication to 
the fact that both fronts  were adopting Marxism under the leadership of the 
Eritrean Labor Party (ELF) and the Peop le's Party (EPLF). These dialogues 
did not bear any positive outcome, de spite attempts by the regime of 
Nimayri to sponsor and encourage them, because they were a sort of tactics 
that lacked credibility of the interlocutors.  
 
The Eritrean arena witnessed afterwards dialogues, which were sponsored 
by the Arab League, such as the dialogues among the Eritrean Liberation 
Front; the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front, Eritrean Liberation Front- 
Revolutionary Committee and the Er itrean Liberation Front – Popular 
Liberation Forces. These dialogues br ought about an agreement known as 
Tunisia Accord; however this accord did not see the light especially as it 
coincided with fierce battles that were going on between the ELF and EPLF. 
These battles ended with military def eat of ELF which was divided into 
several factions that were named ELF.  
 
Following the failure of the Tunisi a Accord; the ELF factions under the 
leadership of Abdullah Idris, ELF the Revolutionary Committee under the 
leadership of Abdulgadir Jailani an d ELF the Popular Liberation Forces 
under the leadership of Osman Saleh Sabe engaged in dialogues under the 
sponsorship of Saudi Arabia and Su dan. These dialogues led to the 
emergence of what was known as the Er itrean Liberation Front - the United 
Organization. However, that experience  relapsed because of differences led 
to its split into two parties under the Er itrean Liberation Front - the National 
Council under the leadership of Abdull ah Idris and the Eritrean Liberation 
Front - the United Organization under th e leadership of Osman Saleh Sabe. 

 3
And then the Eritrean Liberation Front  of Abdullah Idris divided into two 
parts; the one under the leadership of  Abdullah Idris and the other under the 
leadership of Abdulgadir Jailani, wh ile the United Organization remained 
united under the leadership of Osman Saleh Sabe.  
 
 Post Independence Dialogue: 
 
After the departure of the Ethiopian oc cupation forces in 1991 from Eritrea; 
and based on the belief that liber ation has been achieved through the 
contributions of all national forces dur ing the years of armed struggle; four 
Eritrean opposition organizations: the ELF, ELF the National Council , ELF 
the United Organization, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement issued a 
memorandum of political declarati on. The memorandum called on   the 
EPLF to overcome differences that  existed during the period of armed 
struggle among the Eritrean factions and to head towards comprehensive 
national reconciliation that would br ing about formation of an interim 
government of national unity pendin g appropriate conditions for the 
establishment of constitutional governme nt that emerge from a democratic 
practice and that would re flect the will of the Eritr ean people. (It is worth 
noting that the ELF- the Revolutionary  Council boycotted the meetings of 
the four organizations that had issued  the memo opposing the participation 
of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement in the meeting). However, the EPLF 
did not respond to the call and announ ced that it did not recognize the 
existence of other political organizatio ns in the Eritrean arena. On the 
martyrs’ day, on June 20, 1992; the Eritrean Presid ent announced his refusal 
to recognize others and asked the leader ship of the organizations to enter 
individually to the country. Based on this principle; the ruling EPLF went on 
the road to devote its totalitarian regime that shackled all forms of 
fundamental freedoms. 
 
Dialogue at the Opposition Level: 
 
In the context of strength ening the efforts of the Er itrean opposition factions 
to resist the dictatorship regime; th e Eritrean opposition arena has witnessed 
a series of dialogues that resulted in the establishment of the following 
combinations at different stages: - 
 
1. The Eritrean Alliance in 1996; and it was an alliance in the form of 
the United National Front since its constituent organizations 

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maintained their autonomy. It had brought together ELF the National 
Council, the ELF and the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement.  
2. The assembly of the Eritrean nati onal forces in 1999, and it brought 
together the three organizations that formed the above mentioned 
Eritrean Alliance, in addition to other organizations and a national 
figure who is Mr. Mohammad Saeed Brahtu. In 2002 the assembly 
developed and was named the Er itrean National Alliance. The 
Democratic Organization of Red Sea Afar and the Eritrean 
Cooperation Parties joined the Alliance. 
3. In 2004 the organizatio ns of ELF the Revolu tionary Council, the 
Eritrean Democratic Party, the Er itrean Popular Movement joined the 
Alliance and again the name was changed to the Eritrean Democratic 
Alliance. In February 2007 the Alliance split into two blocks; but each 
bloc holding the same name. 
  
Unification Experiences:  
   
The Eritrean opposition aren a has witnessed two expe riences of unification 
which based on similarity of progr ams and political premises. These 
experiences represented in the integration betw een ELF and the ELF the 
National Council in 2000 and the unifica tion that has merg ed the National 
Congress, the Eritrean Popular Moveme nt and the Eritrean Revolutionary 
Democratic Front under the name of the National Salvation Front. 
 
Dialogue between the Government and the Opposition: 
 
There has been no dialogue between the opposition and the government as a 
result of the government’s attitude of refusing to recognize the existence of 
Eritrean opposition. The Eritrean State c onfronted efforts of Eritrea’s friends 
with categorical rejection for any attempt to persuade it by the importance of 
dialogue with its opponent s, while opposition fact ions affirmed firm 
positions to enter into serious dial ogue with the government under the 
sponsorship of mediators acceptable to both sides in order to find a peaceful 
settlement to the political crisis in Eritrea.  
 
Despite the slogan of dialogue among the political forces has been there for 
more than half a century; however, the issue of national unity in Eritrea is 
still facing major challenges, especially after the experience of a dictatorial 
regime which has deepened the crisis of trust between the components of the 
Eritrean people. The political forces should engage in a political dialogue 

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that addresses critical issues such  as religion, identity, democratic 
transformation and mechanisms of governance which would ensure peaceful 
coexistence among the components of the Eritrean people.  
 
The Eritrean – Eritrean dialogue, Multiple Molds and Poor Results  
 
Despite multiplicity of templates of national dialogu e which are known 
through historical experiences of hum anity, it is difficult to define the 
appropriate mold that fit the Eritrean  case at this time. The difficulty to 
figure out a suitable mold is driven by some significant observations, which 
we will try to mention some of them:-  
 
• The expected parties of the dialo gue at this stage in its most 
formations – organizational or political – are an extension of an earlier 
stage which is the stage of the re volution, whereby the EPLF as a 
school and as an organization repres ents key party in the expected 
dialogue, as well as the ELF thro ugh its historical experience and 
political school represents another political party, noting some new 
directions here and there without undermining the basic hypothesis.  
• There were dialogues among thes e components as factions and 
political schools, but these dialogues have not been, so far, subjected 
to systematic and objective evalua tion, and this remains a very 
significant issue for building up pillars for upcoming dialogue. 
• Despite the unity of purpose and motivation during the period of 
armed struggle, which was liberation of the country and expulsion of 
the colonizer, and the agreement on the principal means; and that was 
the means of armed struggle un til victory and liberation of the 
country; however, the dialogue did no t meet the desired objectives at 
any of its historical stages. There is  a fact that can not be denied in 
some of these stages: the pres ence of progress and theoretical 
breakthroughs; and it is a point not in  favor of dialogue at this stage 
following the divergence in goals and multiplicity of means. 
• Assuming that the government is one side and the opposition is 
another side at this stage with the non-existence of  any tangible 
experiences in this regard, the gove rnment certainly is not a single 
entity as well as the oppositio n. Hence the dialogue among the 
components of each camp is not a motivating experience. A note 
worth mentioning here is the pres ence of dialogue in the opposition 
camp. However, it is not up-to- the historical experience and the 
challenges ahead. Meanwhile, we fi nd a great deal of atrophy in the 

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experience of dialogue within the government, and all the attempts 
had not only a disappointing ends but also tragic in its several phases.  
• Dialogue over historical experiences results from the feeling of the 
parties the pressure of a problem a nd the need to overcome it; a thing 
which has not been achieved yet, a lthough there were varying degrees 
between the two blocs on one hand, and the components of each bloc 
separately on the other hand. 
 
Prospective of the Eritrean – Eritrean Dialogue   
 
The above mentioned observations ar e general introductions which would 
help us in trying to understand the fu ture of the Eritrean-Eritrean dialogue, 
particularly in its principal dimens ion – dialogue between the government 
and the opposition. Certainly this dialo gue is, so far, hypothetical dialogue; 
and this hypothesis stems from the n eed of everyone for dialogue with the 
existence of deeply-rooted crisis in the Eritrean political arena. All the 
Eritrean political powers realize this fact, but they differ in its causes, at the 
same time, these powers shortens the pr oblem in a way that could help them 
avoid responsibility, and af terwards justify non- initiating to open a page of 
real handling which starts with dial ogue. The Eritrean government assumes 
that the problem is an international avidities–Ethiopian and American- at 
this stage, and that the opposition is not more than one of the tools used by 
these international powers, while the opposition believes that the problem 
lies in the regime and its composition as well as defective vision, and that 
the problem is resolved with the demise of the regime.  
These assumptions are not void of some  truth, but they are not the whole 
truth. Thus the appropriate approach, in our estimation, is recognizing the 
crisis and identifying its factual ca uses. For example th e government must 
recognize that there is deep internal crisis which resulted by its policies. This 
is because the government is originally  one of the revolu tion factions that 
did not recognize other and also did not  entertain the id ea of seeking any 
constitutional legitimacy, especially after the last Eritrean –Ethiopian war 
(1998 -2000).  
 
The opposition also  must recognize that there ar e international and regional 
avidities, and that it must not be instruments for others. These keys, 
undoubtedly, hold numerous intertwine d details upon which significant 
attitudes and commitments are built.  
Negotiating is a complicated process which depends on persuasion on the 
one hand and pressure on the other.  Pressure can practiced only through 

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certain factors represented in the availa bility of adequate information to the 
interlocutor and possession of hidden cards to bring out in the right time, but 
the most important thing in the proces s of dialogue and negotiation is the 
capability to present conces sions and alternatives. The success of dialogue 
depends on the magnitude of  concessions that could be  made by the parties; 
however, concessions always come as a result of weakness or awareness of 
the problem. Hence the parties always  seek to improve their negotiating 
positions by imposing some facts on the ground and principles in the 
conscience.  
 
In this regard; the expected sides of dialogue in Eritrea – the government and 
the opposition - have the elements of success of the dialogue, as both sides 
have strengths and weakness es, and this is very impo rtant issue because this 
forms a kind of balance. 
 
Strengths of the Government: 
 
A. The government enjoys the intern ational recognition, and it has 
diplomatic representation and external relations at the world level.  
B. The government controls the for ce on the ground, the army and 
security in addition to the civil service.  
C. The government possesses more po werful and organized media than 
the opposition.  
D. The government exists on the gr ound of the country while the 
effectiveness of the opposition is outside the battlefield.  
 
Weaknesses of the Government 
 
A. Non-existence of constitutional legi timacy to prop up the government 
and the absence of law and justice constituents.  
B. Deteriorated economic and security situation.  
C. Direct regional threat and indirect international threat.   
D. Great hatred by all sectors of the people.  
E. Non-existence of qualified cadre in  all government utilities, including 
senior and constitutional positions.  
F. Non-existence of strategic planning in addition to centralization of the 
state at the disposal of the presiden t, an issue which makes the others 
either people of interest or scared, but not convinced.  
G. Political, financial and moral corruption that has beaten all sectors of 
country. 

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Strengths of the Opposition  
 
The most important points of strengt h of the opposition is  playing on the 
weaknesses of the government and cr iticizing these weaknesses and in 
presenting theoretical alternatives without holding political or moral 
responsibility for provision of the alte rnatives as long as it is outside the 
government. The opposition also could bring up concepts of democracy, 
human rights and good governance that  have been internationally 
acceptable.  
 
Weaknesses of the Opposition  
 
A. Continuing differences among factions  of the opposition, which bears 
in some of its features the historical differences.  
B. Weakness of the opposition on th e ground and being centralized in 
abroad. 
C.  Absence of international relations except only in very limited context.  
D. Weakness of the mobilization and organizational mech anisms of the 
opposition to deal with the people.  
E. Lack of planning in its performanc e and meager information about its 
opponent for its presence outside the country.  
F. Great shortage leadership and the lack of popular charismatic leaders.  
 
The Eritrean – Eritrean Dialogue, Living Notion but Absent Action   
 
The two would be dialoguing parties ha ve points of strength and weakness 
to hold a dialogue; however the supposed dialogue has never taken place yet. 
Among the various factors that hindered the occurrence of such a dialogue, 
the following factors would be worth mentioning. 
A. The decision-making mentality of the country, the EPLF, has been 
known over the course of its histor y for an exclusionary approach. 
The results of the referendum for independence which demonstrated 
an Eritrean consensus was a historical opportunity  for national 
reconciliation, and so did the Er itrean-Ethiopian war in 1998 along 
other opportunities the EPLF downplayed.  
B. Weakness of the opposition in all as pects: politics, military, media, 
diplomacy, and organization. It has never posed a day a threat to the 
government; and hence the oppositi on, according to the government's 

 9
assumptions, has never caused a prac tical pressure which necessitated 
neither conducting a dialogue nor offering concessions.  
C. The Eritrean-Ethiopian war provided the regime an opportunity for 
finding justifications for conti nuation, and for suspending the 
constitution. Besides, the repercussi on of the last war with Ethiopia 
made the regime to get ride of potential influential figures from within 
the EPLF.  
D. Lack of strategic visions for th e active regional actors; and hence 
following a reactionary approach while dealing w ith either the 
Eritrean government or the opposition.  
E. Eritrea has never become a priority in international interests. If the 
case were the other way round, the international powers would search 
for factors of stability of the state through imposing compromises and 
offering concessions. 
 
Opportunities for dialogue and its success 
 
There are still opportunities of conducti ng an Eritrean – Eritrean dialogue as 
long as the political pr oblem exists; and the possibilities for the success of 
such dialogue on the theoretical leve l are also very high. However on the 
practical level initiating a dialogue is beyond a fantasy putting aside its 
chances of success. Perhaps this is the puzzling point in the Eritrean 
problem.  
 
The success of any dialogue relies  on intersecting opportunities and 
antagonism for either party. These coul d be the expected agenda of either 
party-the government and the opposition- on the round table. 
 
Agenda of the opposition 
 
The opposition is expected to projec t, following the procedural term 
achieved by initiating a dialogue. This pr ocedural term is recognition of the 
government and the presence of a mediator acceptable to both parties: -  
A.  Releasing of prisoners and lifti ng of grievances through agreed upon 
mechanisms. 
B.  Transferring to a democratic system and conducting of internationally 
monitored fair elections. 
C.  There should be a transitional government (of national unity) and 
transitional constitution to arrange for this. 

 10
D.  Balanced development programme that embodies an affirmative 
approach for the most affected regions. 
E.  Repatriation of refugees to their areas along with their integration 
into the society in coordination with the international community. 
 
Agenda of the government  
 
The government is expected to bring up, in the negotiations, the following 
points:  
A.  Recognition of the significant ro le played by the EPLF in the 
liberation of the country and its ad ministration and protection of the 
sovereignty of the country as well as resources.  
B. A clear-cut stance of the opposition regarding the verdict of border 
demarcation as well as concerning the Ethiopian position on this 
issue.  
C. Maintaining the existing instituti ons and working through them; and 
hence opening a new page without signaling judiciary trials or 
prosecutions.  
D. There might be demands to keep the president as a head of the 
transitional government.  
 
A careful reading for the thorough projected agenda could apparently tell the 
possibility of striking an agreement. Despite a discrepancy in form that 
appears between the articles of the age ndas, however they are not divergent 
to a degree they could be described as  parallels and impossible to intersect. 
For instance, fear from external gree d and regional interventions are shared 
obsessions between the opposition a nd the government as well as the 
position concerning the border demarc ation decision between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia and the necessity to be commi tted it. This makes clear that the 
problem lies in n initiating a dial ogue; and hence looki ng for conducting a 
dialogue has become an end at this tim e without seeking the assumptions of 
its success or not. The procedural s tipulations remain the appropriate 
approach; and this approach is not for th e interest of either party but for the 
interests of dialogue. These stipulati ons are reciprocal recognition and an 
appropriate mediator.  
 
Summary:  
 
The Eritrean-Eritrean dialogues, with Eritrean will, is unexpected due to 
factors that have been discussed in details. These factors include 

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psychological, historical and political factors in addition to reciprocal 
mistrust. It seems apparently clear th at the dialogue could succeed provided 
it is held on an appropriate forum de spite the intersection in the projected 
agendas. Platforms and mediators s hould usually meet the appropriate 
conditions including an ab ility to influence the dialoguing parties and to 
have interests in the success of the dialogue. Th erefore, this paper, in 
conclusion, proposes that the Sudan, fo r instance, with Arab support (Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) is the suitable platform for conducting the dialogue 
between the two sides.  
 
Incidents have drawn the Sudanese - Eritrean relations not only towards 
more rapprochements, but also towa rds coming up with common positions 
regarding decisive issues; a matter  which necessitates finding inclusive 
solutions that transcend the territorial border of each country. Thus each of 
the two countries is concerned, at this  time, about the stability of the other 
for their own interest. This is what Er itrea is trying to implement through its 
mediations in issues of Eastern Suda n and Darfur. Likewise, the Sudan is 
called for to search for the factors of stability in Eritrea; and that would be a 
political solution for the problem of  Eritrea. Ethiopia also possesses 
significant keys for stability of Eritrea and formation of its future because of 
the geopolitical weight it enjoys. More over, Sudan could also contribute in 
defusing the tensions between Eritrea an d Ethiopia owing to its balanced 
relations with both countr ies while maintaining, in a balanced manner, the 
interests of the two countries on one si de and the interests of the Eritrean 
government and opposition on the ot her. Sudan could also reduce, 
depending on the mutual trust between the two countries, the Ethiopian fears 
regarding this dialogue. 
 
According to the existing facts, the politi cal stability in Eritrea is in need of 
something greater than reconcilia tion between the regime and the 
opposition, even if that reconciliati on is the most important element. 
Because of the weakness that the opposit ion is suffering; some people might 
think that this opposition is  not qualified, at this time, to engage in such a 
dialogue. However, no matter how weak  is the Eritrean opposition in the 
government's point of view ; this opposition has just demands and even if it 
suffers several internal factors related to its historical and political make up 
in addition to external factors; mostly the United States of America's desire 
of the continuation of the regime since th ere is no alternative; and so that to 
avoid the collapse the stat e like what has happened in Somalia, an issue 
which increases fears against the spread of terrorism.  Consequently, there is 

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a suitable opportunity for Sudan to ma ke use of its relations with these 
powers to take a decision to launch more effective and influential step, and 
that is a national Eritrean-Eritrean dialogue. 
 
Conclusion  
 
In conclusion we would like to remind  the honorable audience that this 
paper was prepared for hypothetical pr oject which has not yet appeared, at 
the same time, the non-existence of objective reasons for not conducting this 
dialogue, despite existence of the collective interest in such a dialogue and 
its success. Therefore, seeking othe r causes and factors, which are not 
necessarily logical, becomes an issu e which deserves exerting efforts; 
perhaps from that angle the non-existent fact can be figured out.