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ERITREA (Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme,
2002-…) 1
Basic data
Population: 4.5 million (2006)
Food emergencies: Yes
IDPs: 32,000 (2007)
Refugee population: 194,000 (2007)
GDP: $1,085 million (2006)
Per capita income: $200 (2006)
HDI: 0.483 – 157th (2005)
GDI: 0.469 – 136th (2005)
Military expenditure: 19.32% (2003)
Social / military expenditure: Military greater than social
Military population: 4.21%
Arms embargo: No
Map
Summary
Type of DDR Mass disarmament and reintegration of armed forces via
security-sector reform in a post-war context.
Groups to demobilise 200,000 soldiers
Executive bodies National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration
Programme (NCDRP), with assistance from the UNDP and
World Bank.
Budget $197.2 million
Timeline From April 2002
Status / synopsis Process of neutralised demobilisation for continued
recruitment of troops and personnel to the armed forces.
Currently, efforts are centred on the reintegration of
decommissioned officers.
Context
Conflict
Eritrea achieved i ndependence from Ethiopia in 1993, though the border between the two
countries was not clearly defined, leading to fighting between the two sides from 1998 to 2000 in
which more than 100,000 people di ed. A cessation of hostilities agreement was signed in 2000
and the UN Security Council set up the UNMEE peace-keeping mission to supervise the
arrangement. The year ended with the signing of a peace agreement in Algiers. This stipulated
1 This report draws extensively on the following sources, from which only direct quotations are cited: World Bank (2002, 2007),
Healy (2007), Mehreteab (2007), UNDP Eritrea (2004, 2006a, 2006b) and Pretorius et al. (2006) PDF page 2
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that both sides would abide by the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC),
which was charged with establishing a definitive border on the basis of the relevant colonial
agreements (1900, 1902 and 1908) and international law. In April 2002, the EEBC issued its
decision, which assigned the disputed border village of Badme (the epicentre of the conflict which
was at that time administered by Ethiopia) to Eritrea, a decision rejected by Ethiopia. As of 1
December, the border was established virtually on the basis of the colonial treaties. As a result,
concern increased over the volatility of the situation and the risk that it would descend into a new
outbreak of violence. However, bo th governments rejected the EEBC ’s suggestion that it should
suspend its functions and establish the border dema rcation solely on paper, and reiterated that
they did not want a return to hostilities.2
Security-sector reform
As part of security-sector reform, the Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DRP) in
Eritrea is a strategy to reduce the number of military officers in the country and generate
significant savings to state budgets.
Background to DDR
Eritrea has been called “a mo bilised nation” (Healy 2007: 6) . In 1993, on the eve of
independence from Ethiopia, 95,000 guerrilla combatants became members of the armed forces,
whilst in 1997 around 54,000 soldiers demobilised . The demobilisation and reintegration process
was considered a success, though later war with Ethiopia reversed this process.
Mehreteab (2007; cf. European Commission 2002: Annex I, 16) offers a list of the lessons
learned and not learned in this demobilisation exercise.
Lessons learned:
The need to consider social reintegration;
The need of a clear definition of structure and institutional responsibilities;
The necessity to incorporate a gender dimension in the programme;
The necessity for training in accordance with the labour market;
The need for participation from NGOs and the private sector (more in theory than practice); and
The necessity to carry out a survey on soldier profiles.
Lessons not learned:
The need to design a general framework for rehabilitation and renewal;
The necessity to incorporate reconstruction, renewal, rehabilitation, and reintegration
programmes; and
The need for participation from beneficiaries, e.g. ex-combatants and communities.
Programme design
Type and designation of DDR
Mass demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration of armed forces via security-sector reform in
a post-war context.
2 Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 52) PDF page 3
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DRP, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. Financed by the World Bank, the
Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project - Emergency Recovery Loan (EDRP-ERL)
is almost synonymous with DRP and is sometimes referred to as the DRP for Eritrea.
Executive bodies
The body responsible for the programme in Eritre a is the NCDRP, created by the government of
Eritrea in April 2001. The NCDRP has carried out programme planning with technical assistance
and training from the UNDP from 2002 to 2006, and cooperation from the World Bank. The
execution of projects falls to government bodies, private consultants, and NGOs.
Guiding principles
According to the European Commission (2002: A nnex I, 19), the guiding principles of the
programme in Eritrea are the following:
An integrated approach to demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration;
Increased attention paid to psychosocial needs and support services for demobilised soldiers and
their families;
Inclusive reintegration support programmes so as to promote social cohesion;
Professional training designed according to labour market analysis;
Counselling and training in the development of micro-enterprise;
Gender awareness and sensitivity to the needs of disabled persons; and
An implementation of components by existing institutions and organisations.
The EDRP-ERL includes within its demobilisation project the following objectives:
The transfer of economic resources from the military to social sector, and
The strengthening of institutional capabilities and reinforcement of macroeconomic stability.
Participants
Around 300,000-350,000 soldiers were mobilised during the war in Eritrea. Around 40,000 had
already formed part of the armed forces before the war, another 40,000 were reincorporated ex-
soldiers (see Background), and the rest were new recruits. The government proposed a
demobilisation of 200,000 soldiers (“Assisting Eritrea…” 2002).
Groups with specific needs
According to one survey (Mehreteab 2007: 46), th e composition of the ar med forces reflects a
certain set of characteristics:
54% of soldiers are between the ages of 20 and 29,
16% are considered to be disabled, and
13% are considered to have psychological problems.
Given that the minimum age for recruitment to the armed forces is 18, there are no child soldiers
in the military; nevertheless the programme in Eritrea identifies soldiers under the age of 25 as
belonging to or in need of specialised programming. PDF page 4
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Budget and financing
In April 2002, the World Bank budgeted a total of $197.2 million for EDRP. This works out to
an average of $985 per soldier for the 200,000 soldiers planned for demobilisation. The
distribution of resources for this budget was the following:
Component $ Millions %
Demobilization 9,2 4,7
Reinsertion (cash) 105 53,2
Reinsertion (in kind) 15 7,6
Reinsertion (NCDRP) 35 17,7
Reintegration (sector programs) 15 7,6
Special target groups 2 1
Institutional strengthening 1,2 0,6
Executive Secretariat 5,4 2,7
Contingencies 9,4 5
Total (estimado) 197,2 100
Source: World Bank (2002: 6)
It is important to note that reinsertion packages count for more than 60% of the budget, whilst
reintegration projects, chiefly micro-credit, counts for a fourth of it.
The project is financed with an Emergency Recove ry Loan, with contributions from the following
three sources:
1. An initial pledge from the World Bank, through the African Infrastructure Fund, of $60
million for the period from 2002 to 2008, though currently more than $64 million has
been paid out.
2. A contribution of $15 million from the WFP in the form of food subsidy.
3. A Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) managed by the World Bank to cover outstanding
budgetary costs. At a conference of donors held in October 2001, the World Bank
pledged $37 million to the MDTF. Of this, $24 million has already been paid out. The
European Commission, expressly mentioning demobilisation as a priority for cooperation
with Eritrea, pledged 47 million euros ($42 million in 2001) through the European
Development Fund, and of this amount, 27 million euros had been paid by 2005. The
other 20 million euros are allotted for post-conflict renewal. The Netherlands gave 4
million euros to a pilot programme designed for 5,000 ex-combatants and pledged an
additional 12.5 million euros. Denmark pledged 2.5 million euros and Norway 1 million
euros. Other donors who pledged funds, according to the World Bank, include Germany,
Belgium, and Switzerland (European Commission 2002, 2007).
The World Bank's Post-Conflict Fund also contributed $700,000 as support to the government of
Eritrea in preparation for a post-conflict project.
The UNDP's Technical Assistance Programme (TAP ) was financed in part by USAID ($580,000)
and by the UNDP itself ($200,000) (USAID 2004).
The Japan International Cooperation Agency allocated approximately 1.5 million euros to the
vocational training of around 500 ex-combatants over the 2005-07 period (JICA 2007).
Schedule
Initially, the government of Eritrea planned a demobilisation period of a year or a year and a
half, and programmes of reintegration for five years. A pilot project designed for 65,000-70,000
participants was planned for November 2001 after the NCDRP was created earlier that year. PDF page 5
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Earlier that autumn, the government announce d it had already demobilised 20,000 persons
(IRIN [2001], Mehreteab [2007: 57] offers a detailed schedule).
The EDRP as a project was completed by the World Bank. The project consisted of 18-24 months
of demobilisation and reinsertion, which bega n in April 2002, and three to four years of
reintegration, whic h was to be completed by the end of 2007. In both broad areas, the
programme has not been able to keep to schedule. Demobilisation was carried out from July 2002
until June 2006. The reintegration of ex-combatants should have occurred over a period of three
to four years following demobilisation. The Worl d Bank fixed December 2008 as its conclusion
date for EDRP. The UNDP's Technical Assistance Programme and USAID, originally planning to
run from April to December 2002, wound up prolonging their operations until December 2006.
Phases
According to the UNDP (2006b: 1), “the demobilisation programme for Eritrea is arguably one
of the best planned programmes of its kind.” However, Mehreteab (2007) argues that there is
considerable difference between what has been planned and what has been executed.
Disarmament and demobilisation
Initially designed in 2002 to demobilise 200,000 combatants over a period of 18 to 24 months,
disarmament and demobilisation has involved the return of military equi pment such as arms and
uniforms, identification, transport to decommissi oning centres, information on the process, a
medical review, and later transport to reinsertion centres. A pilot project was organised for the
disarmament and demobilisation of 5,000 soldiers, for a larger process divided over three phases
with demobilisations of 60,000-70 ,000 soldiers per phase. In th e first of these three phases,
priority is given to “special groups”, that is, women, disabled persons, veterans, and economically
productive persons, as well as re-mobil ised soldiers (World Bank 2002: 8-10). The
decommissioning process is supposed to last for approximately a week and for each week, at each
centre, the process will decommission 500 soldiers.
A pilot project was conducted from April to September 2002. According to the UNDP, 104,400
soldiers had demobilised by the end of 2006, whilst the World Bank took stock of 65,000
demobilised soldiers within its programme by th e end of 2007. In additi on to being slow, the
demobilisation process was frustrated by two processes running in parallel: continued recruitment
of combatants and reintegration of combatants within a “militarised work service” (see the
Reintegration section below). As a result of this , the number of soldiers in the military rose from
300,000 at the end of the war in Eritrea to 350,000-420,000 soldiers by the end of 2007, with
half this number in active military service and the other half in the “militarised work service”
(Mehreteab 2007).
Mehreteab (2007: 34) argues that there is no “pol itical will to demobili se soldiers/combatants”
and claims that most demobilised combatants are di sabled, chronically ill, or pregnant or nursing
women. The military, additionally, has recruited “nearly the same number” of youth. Viewed in
this light, the priority to demobi lise “special groups” has been little more than a substitution of
these groups by male youth. Mehr eteab sees in these facts the cause behind donors' withdrawal of
support for the demobilisation process, starti ng in 2005, and their transfer of primary interests
to, initially, reintegration projects for already demobilised soldiers, and later, general
programmes for development.3
3 See also Pretorius et al. (2006: 88 and Annex II, 54) PDF page 6
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Reinsertion
A grant under the Transitional Safety Net (TSN) supports reinsertion efforts in Eritrea. Salary
for demobilised soldiers is based on the $50 monthl y salary that a regular soldier receives, a sum
in theory sufficient to support a family. TSN consists of cash payments of an average $525 per
demobilised soldier, though each individual amount depends on rank and time served in the
military. If we add the WFP's food contribution, the average payment works out to $600 per
person on average. Some disabl ed combatants receive additional aid of between $300 and $450.
Payments are made in two instalments: during the first three months of decommissioning and
between the fourth and sixth months.
In terms of implementation of this component, the UNDP talks about a monthly payment of
around $33 over six to 12 months for (140,400?) ex-combatants, whilst the World Bank claims
to have already paid out $330 per capita in allowances to 65,000 ex-combatants.
Reintegration
The reintegration process slowed down at the end of 2006 but recuperated in 2007. By October
2007, assistance for integration had reache d 44,432 ex-combatants and other community
members of a final total goal of 83,868.
Employment reintegration
In 2006, 1,722 demobilised soldie rs received a total $1.47 million as part of a Microcredit and
Loan Plan.
Some of these demobilised soldiers were assigned to “militarised work service” as part of a
government development and reconstruction campai gn called Warsai Yekaalo. In exchange for
nominal remuneration for an unspecified amount of time, or until the border with Ethiopia
settled, the government requested a promise from soldiers to work for the country's
reconstruction. Meanwhile, demobilisation and reintegration rhetoric covered up the real
character of this campaign. At the start of 2003, for example, 3,000 soldiers employed in civil
roles were considered “demobilised”, but under a promise to continue as employees for two more
years in the same institutions. The Eritrean govern ment justifies the recruitment of new soldiers
and this type of reintegration in the military on the grounds that it is stabilising the situation with
Ethiopia.4
Training
The Ministry of Education runs rural-development activities and vocational training programmes
for creating micro-enterprise, although there tends to be a lack of material resources and
specialists for training teachers.
The Japan International Cooperation Agency has financed and given technical support for a
project to train ex-combatants for employment. The Ministry of Education oversees this project.
From 2005 to 2007, the ministry ran 23 courses in construction, hairdressing, agriculture,
plumbing, etc., with partici pation from around 500 ex-combat ants. 98.9% of participants
finished their course and more than 60% found employment, 45% in the first five months after
completion and in the filed in which they had received training. From this project, with
cooperation from the Savings and Microcredits Program, ex-combatants have also opened
businesses (JIAC 2007).
4 A discussion on the positive and negative aspects of the socioeconomic function played by these oversized armed forces, both as
a source of employment for youth and as a place of ideological indoctrination, for instance, can be found in Healy (2007: 8) and
Mehreteab (2007: 58) PDF page 7
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The National Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW) has organised training courses for women ex-
combatants in tailoring, craf tsmanship, and hairdressing. Designed for 230 participants, NUEW
plans to offer these women the necessary equipm ent and resources for income generation after
training (Seyoum 2007).
Psychosocial assistance
The NCDRP acknowledges the importance of psychosocial assistance for ex-combatants returning
to their communities of origin and for community reintegration. As such, the UNDP's TAP has
worked to train 500 psychosocial counsellors. However, Mehreteab co nsiders this initiative to be
insufficient and warns of the amount of psychological problems, high levels of disorientation, and
a rise in suicide and alcoholism amongst ex-combatants.
Vulnerable groups
Differentiated assistance is offered to disabled persons in the form of counselling, vocational
training, loans, employment, grants, and access to housing. Specific orientation is provided for
persons with HIV/AIDS. In 2006, the Ministry of Employment pr oposed allocating $2.6 million,
funded by the World Bank, for offering loans to disabled demobilised soldiers (Seyoum 2006).
Lessons learned
Reports by Healy (2007), includin g the conference paper by Mehreteab, and Pretorius et al.
(2006) record the evaluations of and lessons learned from the programme in Eritrea.
Bibliography and sources consulted
“Assisting Eritrea in its transition from war to peace” (2002). In World Bank: Eritrea. News &
Events, 21 May. <http://go.worldbank.org/D7O10UF8Y0>.
European Commission (2002). Eritrea – European Community. Country Strategy Paper and
National Indicative Programme for the Period 2002-2007. Brussels: EC, October.
——— (2007). Addendum n.º 3 to the Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative
Programme for the period 2002-2007. Brussels: EC.
Healy, S. (2007). Eritrea’s Economic Survival. Summary Record of a Conference Held on 20
April 2007. London: Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs.
IRIN (2001). “130 million dollars pledged for demobilisation”, in IRIN-HOA Weekly Round-up
No. 55, 15-21 August.
JICA (2007). The Project on Basic Training for Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Eritrea.
Summary of Terminal Evaluation. Tokyo: JICA.
Mehreteab, A. (2007). “‘Border Conflict’ – 1998-2000 and its Psychological Impact on the
Youth”. Conference paper in Healy, Op.cit., pp. 23-77.
Pretorius, C. et al. (2006). Evaluation of the European Commission’s Support to the State of
Eritrea. Country Level Evaluation. Final Report. Rotterdam: ECORYS-NEI, 10 May.
School for a Culture of Peace (2008). Alert 2008! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and
Peacebuilding. Barcelona: Icaria.
<http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/alerta/alerta/alerta08i.pdf>.
Seyoum, S. (2007). “NUEW giving training to women”, in Shaebia, 9 October.
<http://www.shaebia.org/artman/publish/printer_5179.shtml>.
——— (2006). “MLHW plans to give lo ans to disabled fighters”, in Shaebia, 25 September.
<http://www.shaebia.org/artman/publish/printer_4679.shtml>.
UNDP Eritrea (2004). Technical Assistance to Demobilize Soldiers. Project Fact Sheet. Asmara:
UNDP, November.
——— (2006a). Country Programme Action Plan (CPAC). 2007-2011. Asmara: Government of
Eritrea and UNDP, December. PDF page 8
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——— (2006b). Technical Assistance to Demobilize Soldiers. Project Fact Sheet. Asmara:
UNDP, November.
USAID (2004). USAID/Eritrea Report on PWD-Related Activities for 2003-2004. Washington:
USAID.
World Bank (2002). Technical Annex for a Proposed Credit of SDR 48.1 Million (US 60 Million
Equivalent) to the State of Eritrea for an Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration
Project. Report No. T7478-ER. Washington: World Bank, 22 April.
——— (2007). Status of Projects in Execution – FY07. Washington: World Bank, 10 October.
Glossary
DRP Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
EDRP-ERL Emergency Demobilization and Reinte gration Project - Emergency Recovery Loan
EEBC Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks (UN)
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NCDRP National Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
TA(P) Technical Assistance (Programme /Project to Demobilize Soldiers)
TSN Transitional Safety NetPDF page 9
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UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USAID United States Agency fo r International Development